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∗ Economic Research Department1. Introduction
1
In last few years, the behavior of international asset prices has often been explained
on the basis of changes in risk aversion. For instance, according to the IMF, the decline in
equity prices recorded between March 2002 and mid-March 2003 followed a sharp increase
in investors’ risk aversion connected with the geopolitical tensions that culminated in the war
in Iraq (IMF, 2003a). By the same token, both the IMF and the BIS explained the subsequent
recovery in equity prices with a decline in risk aversion (see IMF, 2003b, and BIS, 2004).
These explanations have been supported empirically with a variety of indicators, usually
created by private ﬁnancial analysts.
2
The favorable attitude of market analysts towards measuring risk aversion contrasts
sharply with the general skepticism that prevails in academic research. For instance, the
classical book on the economics of uncertainty by Laffont (1993) has an entire chapter on
‘Measuring Risk Aversion and Risk’, without a single reference to empirical works!
3 In
his seminal contribution to the theory of risk-bearing, Arrow (1970) infers the value of
risk aversion parameters on the basis of the properties of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility functions, without attempting any estimate.
4 This skepticism derives not only from
the unobservability of individuals’ preferences, but also from the observational equivalence
between changes in risk and in risk aversion. This equivalence is due to the fact that an
increase (decrease) in either of them causes asset prices to decline (rise) and risk premia to
increase (decrease).
1 We thank Lieven De Moor, Ming Liu, Miroslav Misina, seminar participants at the 2004 French Finance
Association Meeting, the 2005 Global Finance Association, the 2005 European Financial Management Asso-
ciation and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Giovanna Poggi gave us valuable research
assistance. Part of thework was carried out while Massimo Sbraciawas visiting the Department of Economics of
New York University, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of theBank of Italy. E-mail: marcello.pericoli@bancaditalia.it,
massimo.sbracia@bancaditalia.it.
2 Illing and Meyer (2005), Misina (2005), Gai and Vause (2004), and IMF (2002, box 3.1) provide valuable
surveys of several atheoretic and model-based measures of risk aversion.
3 In fact, Laffont concludes: “It is of course difﬁcult to obtain sufﬁcient information about an agent’s pref-
erences, to know whether his absolute risk aversion increases or decreases (since this requires information about
the third derivative of his utility function).” (Laffont, 1993, p. 24, cited from Hartog et al., 2002).
4 Starting from the boundedness property of utility functions, Arrow (1970) concludes that the relative risk
aversion should be approximately equal to one — a condition implying that preferences are represented by a
logarithm function, as ﬁrst suggested by Bernoulli (1738).8
Kumar and Persaud (2001, 2002) have recently made an interesting attempt to break this
observational equivalence by exploiting a special feature of asset pricing models. According
to these authors, standard pricing models are such that changes in risk aversion modify the
rank of the expected returns on assets relative to the rank of their riskiness, while changes in
the riskiness of assets leave the relative ranks unchanged. Accordingly, they build an indicator
of investors’ risk aversion, called the Risk Appetite Index (RAI), given by Spearman’s rank
correlation between the expected excess return and the riskiness of a cross-section of assets.
In this work, we examine the RAI both theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical
part, we reﬁne a previous analysis of Misina (2003), who gathers the conditions under which
the RAI can distinguish between risk and risk aversion into two propositions (Section 2). Next,
building on Kumar and Persaud (2002) and Misina (2003), we examine the RAI in the context
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Section 3). We focus on the CAPM because it
is the workhorse of asset pricing theory. Its main prediction, that equilibrium expected returns
are proportional to their covariance with the aggregate risk, is shared with virtually every other
pricing model that has been taken to the data.
5 We show that the RAI distinguishes between
changes in the riskiness of assets and changes in investors’ risk aversion only under very
restrictive assumptions. Speciﬁcally, we need to assume either that investors hold portfolios
with equally weighted assets, or that asset returns are independent, that the shocks affecting
riskiness are idiosyncratic and that the number of assets is sufﬁciently large.
Although these assumptions are theoretically restrictive, we need to verify empirically
to what extent they bias the behavior of the RAI. We do so by comparing the RAI with a
measure of risk aversion derived from the estimation of a CAPM — a model that does not
require either independent returns or speciﬁc assumptions on the nature of the shocks. Using
monthly dataon all thestocks of theDowJonesEuro Stoxx and thoseof the Standard & Poor’s
500 from January 1973 to November 2005, we show that the two estimates are surprisingly
similar. By focusing on the statistical properties of the RAI, we are able to explain this result
proving that, under a certain condition, the RAI can approximate the risk aversion parameter
of a CAPM. This condition — which requires the ratio between the variance of asset returns
and the variance of asset riskiness to be sufﬁciently small — is met in our sample (Section 4).
5 Generally, it is the meaning of aggregate risk that differs across models: in the standard CAPM it is the
return of the market portfolio; in Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979) it is aggregate consumption.9
In Section 5 we further discuss the usefulness of the RAI. We conclude that, despite the
empirical similarities with the CAPM-based indicator, the theoretical limitations represent a
serious shortcoming against the use of the RAI.
2. Theoretical foundations
TheRAI is deﬁned astherank correlation (measured bySpearman’s coefﬁcient)between
the expected excess return and the riskiness of a cross-section of assets. The ﬁrst element
needed to build it is the expected excess return (excess return hereafter) on each asset i, that
we denote with Rex
i , i = 1,...,n. The excess return Rex
i is the difference between the expected




i = E (Ri) − Rf . (1)
The expected return on asset i, in turn, is deﬁned as the expected price plus the expected






In asset pricing models, a modiﬁcation in a structural parameter produces a change of current
prices; this, in turn, causes changes in expected and excess returns. Thus, excess returns adjust
to a new equilibrium through changes — with the opposite sign — in current asset prices Pi.
The second element in the RAI is the riskiness of each asset i, that we denote with λi. In
the following sections, the parameter λi will be deﬁned precisely according to the asset pricing
model considered. We will see that this deﬁnition is critical in order to assess the properties
of the pricing model and, in turn, the appropriateness of the RAI as a measure of the market’s
risk aversion.
As pointed out by Misina (2003), the RAI stems from an important property. We say
that a change in a parameter of the asset pricing model that affects the excess returns on assets
6 Hereafter E denotes the expectation operator, V ar thevarianceoperator, Cov thecovarianceoperator and
Corr the correlation operator. All these operators refer to unconditional moments. We also denote by sign the
operator that takes the value 1 if its arguments share the same sign and −1 otherwise.
7 Here we have adopted the standard deﬁnition of expected returns (see Cochrane, 2001, Chapter 1). Note
that Kumar and Persaud (2001) deﬁne Xi as the long-run price of asset i.10






















= −1 ∀i  = j . (3)
In words, Property (3) states that the “rank effect” obtains when a change in a parameter of
the pricing model causes changes in the excess returns on each asset that are monotone (either
increasing or decreasing) in their riskiness.
8 Deﬁnition (3) leaves indeterminate both the sign
of the change in expected returns (which can be positive or negative) and the sign of the
monotonicity relationship between the change in excess return and the riskiness of each asset
(increasing or decreasing). These indeterminacies give rise to four possible cases. We argue
below that in all possible cases property (3) affects the rank correlation between excess returns
and risks in a cross-section of assets.
In general, there are several measures of rank correlation between two variables (see
Stuart and Ord, 1991, Chapter 26, for a brief overview). Following Kumar and Persaud (2001,
2002) in this paper we use Spearman’s measure of rank correlation (denoted with ρs) which
takes values in the interval [−1,1]; speciﬁcally, ρs = 1 (ρs = −1) when the rank of the values
of one variable is exactly the same as (inverse of) the rank of the values of the other variable.
In order to understand why the rank effect affects the rank correlation between Rex
and λ, suppose that, before the rank effect shows up, the correlation is less than 1. This
assumption means that there are at least two assets, say assets i and j, such that λi > λj and
Rex
i < Rex
j . Hence, consider a change in a parameter that causes a rank effect and, for now,
assume that this effect gives rise to an increase in excess returns (i.e. ∆Rex
i and ∆Rex
j are
both positive). Suppose also that property (3) holds because we observe increasing changes in
excess returns; namely, ∆Rex
i > ∆Rex
j > 0. Then, if the increase in the excess return of asset
i is sufﬁciently larger than the one of asset j, it can reverse the relationship between excess
returns into Rex
i > Rex
j , thereby strengthening the rank correlation between excess returns and
risks. Analogously, suppose that the rank effect gives rise to a decrease in excess returns (i.e.
8 The rank effect as deﬁned by property (3) generalizes the one stated by Misina (2003), who considers
only changes in excess returns that are increasing in the riskiness of assets. Our deﬁnition is more relevant to
the analysis of the RAI, because, as we discuss in the rest of this section, we can show that the rank correlation




j are both negative) and that property (3) holds with ∆Rex
j < ∆Rex
i < 0; then,
if the decrease in Rex
j is sufﬁciently larger (in absolute terms) than the decrease in Rex
i , the
relationship between the excess returns on the two assets can be reversed into Rex
i > Rex
j , and
this will strengthen the rank correlation between excess returns and risks.
By the same token, assume that the rank correlation between excess returns and risks
is larger than -1, so that there exist at least two assets, say assets i and j, such that
λi > λj and Rex
i > Rex
j . Assume also that the change in the parameter determines a rank





j > 0). Then, the resulting rank correlation may weaken, as the change in excess









j are both negative.
Thus, the rank effect — as deﬁned by condition (3) — tends to modify (either strengthen
or weaken) the rank correlation between excess returns and risks.
Now suppose that in an asset pricing model property (3) is fulﬁlled only by changes
in the risk aversion parameter while changes in risk do not fulﬁll it. Then, we could exploit
this property in order to discriminate between changes in risk and changes in risk aversion.
Speciﬁcally, changes in asset prices that turn out to modify therank correlation between excess
returnsand risks will bedueto changesin risk aversion; moreover, if changes in asset prices do
not modify the rank correlation between excess returns and risks, then they can be attributed
to changes in risks.
9
Following Misina (2003), the conditions under which the RAI can be used to
discriminatebetweenchangesin risk and changesin riskaversion can beconveniently gathered
into two propositions. The ﬁrst proposition speciﬁes that changes in risk aversion have a rank
effect; namely:
Proposition 1 A change in investors’ risk aversion has a rank effect on excess returns across
different assets.
9 In order to identify correctly changes in risk aversion with changes in the rank correlation, it is also
important that changes in risk aversion of opposite signs have opposite effects on the rank correlation. If this
condition did not hold, in fact, the rank correlation, as measured by Spearman’s coefﬁcient, would eventually go
to one of its borders (1 or −1). On the contrary, when this condition holds we can identify an increase in risk
aversion with, for instance, an increase in the rank correlation and vice versa. We thank a referee for pointing out
the importance of this further condition.12
Of course, this proposition cannot be veriﬁed empirically, since risk aversion is an
unobservable parameter. Moreover, we cannot use its consequences on the rank correlation
between excess returns and risks to detect changes in risk aversion because, in principle, a
rank effect can show up for reasons other than changes in risk aversion. Therefore, we can
introduce a second proposition that addresses both issues. Speciﬁcally, we can assume that
only changes in risk aversion have a rank effect, or, equivalently, if we assume that risk and
risk aversion are the sole parameters of the pricing model that can change over time, then the
second proposition states that changes in risk do not have a rank effect:
Proposition 2 A change in the riskiness of assets does not have a rankeffect on excess returns
across different assets.
Thus, when both propositionshold, therank effect can be used to break theobservational
equivalence between risk and risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, we can use the rank correlation
between excess returns and risks to detect changes in investors’ risk aversion.
In the following section we will examine whether Propositions 1 and 2 can be proved in
the context of a standard asset pricing model such as the CAPM.
3. The Risk Appetite Index and the CAPM
In Kumar and Persaud (2002), the authors motivate the RAI by considering changes in
risk and in risk aversion in the CAPM. However, they focus only on the induced changes in
the excess return on the market portfolio (i.e. on the optimal portfolio of the representative
investor) and do not calculate explicitly the effect of the parameter changes on the excess
return on each risky asset. The latter calculations are critical to verify whether Propositions 1
and 2 hold and, therefore, to establish whether the RAI can be a measure of changes in risk
aversion.
Kumar and Persaud (2002) start their analysis with a well-known relationship between
the excess return and the variance of the market portfolio. For the sake of simplicity, suppose
that thereareonly risky assetsin themarket. If investors prefer frontierportfolios— deﬁned as
the portfolios with the minimum variance in the class of the portfolios with the same expected




m = a[E (Rm)]
2 + bE (Rm) + c , (4)
where Rm is the stochastic return on the market portfolio, σ2
m denotes its variance, and a, b
and c are constants which depend on the expected returns on each risky asset and the variance-
covariance matrix of asset returns. Equation (4) deﬁnes the portfolio frontier — i.e. the locus
of all frontier portfolios — which is a parabola in the σ2
















Figure 1: Effect of a change in the risk aversion
The slope of the curve (4) is the investors’ risk aversion (see Kumar and Persaud, 2002,
orCochrane, 2001, Chapter5). Hence, changesinrisk aversion determineashift oftheoptimal
portfolio that modiﬁes both the expected return and the variance of the market portfolio, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
Kumar and Persaud (2002) also consider an alternative scenario in which a simultaneous
change in the riskiness of all assets occurs. However, they focus on a very speciﬁc change:
namely, one that gives rise only to a change in a single parameter of equation (4), that is the
parameter c of the parabola. If c changes, say it goes from c to c′ > c, it modiﬁes only the
riskiness of the market portfolio, without changing its expected return. Figure 2 illustrates this
effect.14
By comparing the different consequences of these two scenarios, the authors conclude
that changes in risk aversion modify the rank correlation between expected returns and risks,
while a simultaneous increase in the riskiness of all assets does not affect it. This claim












Figure 2: Effect of a simultaneous change in the riskiness of all assets
By focusing only on the implications for the market portfolio of parameter changes,
however, Kumar and Persaud neglect the implicationsfortheexcess returnsof each risky asset,
which are essential for the validity of the RAI. For instance, in the case represented in Figure
1, a change in the return of the market portfolio does not necessarily imply that the excess
returns on assets change monotonically in their riskiness, as Proposition 1 requires. Similarly,
the case represented in Figure 2 does not excludethat the changein the excessreturns on assets
yields a rank effect, as Proposition 2 establishes.
10
Thus, even withinthevery speciﬁcchangein theriskinessofassets considered by Kumar
and Persaud (2002), the validity of the RAI remains dubious. Therefore, we now turn to
examine the consequences of changes in risk and risk aversion for the riskiness of each asset
to verify whether Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
10 Similarly, Pericoli and Sbracia (2004) show that the RAI cannot distinguish, in general, between changes
in risk and changes in risk aversion even in the ad hoc asset pricing model proposed by Kumar and Persaud
(2001).15
3.1 The CAPM with exponential utility and normal returns
Following Cochrane (2001, Chapter 9) and Misina (2003), and in order to set the
notation, in this section we consider a standard CAPM with multivariate normal returns
and identical investors with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences. These
assumptions are by no means necessary for our conclusions on the RAI. In fact, Appendix A
shows that if we focus on an appropriate measure of risk aversion, then a more general CAPM
with heterogeneous agents and risk averse preferences would yield the same conclusions as
those obtained with the simpler CAPM analyzed here.
Consider a single consumer, interpreted as a representative agent of a large number of
identical consumers, with preferences given by the CARA utility:
u(C) = −e
−γC , (5)
where γ is the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion.
This representative investor has initial wealth W, which can be split between a risk free
asset paying Rf and a set of n risky assets paying a stochastic return R = (R1,...,Rn). Let
a = (a1,...,an) denotethe amount of wealth invested in each asset i with ai ∈ R, ∀i = 1,...,n.
The budget constraint then implies:








We also assume that asset returns are multivariate normally distributed with mean
E (R) = (E (R1),...,E (Rn)) and variance-covariance matrix Σ:
R ∼ N(E(R),Σ) . (7)
11 We are implicitly assuming a two-period framework where agents invest in the ﬁrst period, and, in the
second period, returns are distributed and consumption occurs.16
The hypothesis (7) implies that consumption, which is an afﬁne transformation of multivariate
normal returns, will be normally distributed:
C ∼ N( C,σ
2
C) ,
with  C = afRf + a′E(R) and σ2
C = a′Σa. Hence, using a property of normal distributions
we can write:









The representative consumer maximizes his expected utility (8) under the budget





where a is the vector whose elements ai are the optimal amounts of wealth invested in each
risky asset i, and where 1 is a vector of ones. Of course, the budget constraint (6) implies that
the optimal amount of wealth invested in the risk free asset is: af = W − 1′a. It is important
to note that: (i) the strict concavity of the utility function (5) implies that the solution (9) is
unique; (ii) each parameter ai is a solution of the problem for given parameter values Rf, γ
and Σ, and for given expected returns E(R).
Thus, thetotalreturn on theinvestor’sportfolio isafRf+a′R, wherethelatteraddendum
is thereturn on therisky portfolio, which wedenotebyRm. Notethattheassumption ofCARA
preferences implies that the amount invested in each risky asset is independent of wealth.
Hence, if investors were heterogeneous in their level of wealth, they would buy the same
amounts of risky assets and different amounts of the risk free asset, the latter depending on
investors’ level of wealth.
In order to obtain the standard formulation of the CAPM, note that: Cov (R,Rm) =
Cov (R,a′R) = Σa. Denote with Rex the vector of the excess returns on each asset, i.e.
Rex = E(R) − 1Rf. Then, rearranging expression (9), we obtain:
R
ex = γ   Cov (R,Rm) . (10)17
3.2 The rank effect
We can now verify whether Propositions 1 and 2 hold; i.e. whether changes in the risk
aversion parameter yield a rank effect (Proposition 1), while changes in risk do not cause a
rank effect (Proposition 2).
We have noted above that the optimal coefﬁcients a deﬁned by (9), from which the
CAPM (10) originates, represent the unique solution of the consumer’s problem for given
parameters Rf, γ and Σ, and for given expected returns. Now suppose that the representative
consumer holds the optimal portfolio (af,a′) with rate of return afRf + a′R. We can ask
what happens when one parameter changes. In equation (9), optimal quantities are obtained
for given prices. Then, in this model only one variable between prices and quantities can
change. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that, for a given optimal allocation (af,a), the
adjustment after a change in a parameter will occur through prices — i.e. through the excess
returns Rex
i . Recall, also, that for each asset i an increase (decrease) in Rex
i occurs through a
decrease (increase) in the asset price Pi. In other words, after a parameter change quantities
remain ﬁxed, equal to a, and prices, i.e. excess returns, adjust.
A preliminary step to verify whether Propositions 1 and 2 hold concerns the deﬁnition of
the riskiness of each asset i. In the CAPM (see Cochrane, 2001, Chapter 1, or Misina, 2003),
this is deﬁned as:
λi = Cov(Ri,Rm) . (11)
Given (11), we can rewrite equation (10) as:
R
ex
i = γλi .





Then, Proposition 1 is established in this model.18





It would seem that Proposition 2 is established, because the derivatives ∂Rex
i /∂λi are constant
for any i; then, a simultaneous increase in the riskiness of all assets does not seem to yield
a rank effect. However, as Misina (2003) points out, the result that the derivatives of the
excess returns on each asset with respect to its riskiness are constant does not necessarily
establish Proposition 2: one has to consider explicitly which parameter has caused theincrease
in riskiness.
In order to prove that Proposition 2 does not hold, we just need to provide a counter
example, which we borrow from Misina (2003).
Example. Assume that there are only two assets, denoted with i and j, with variances σ2
i and
σ2



































∂σij , which gives rise to a rank effect.
This example highlights a general problem (see Misina, 2003): changes in the riskiness
of one asset will affect expected returns also on other assets and will, in turn, be affected
by changes in the riskiness of other assets. The previous example shows that this type of19
dependence may give rise to a rank effect, unless all assets are equally weighted (ai = aj
∀(i,j)).
An obvious way to preclude the possibility of these patterns is to assume that asset







i = V ar(Ri). In this model, λi = aiσ2
i. It is immediately clear that a change in risk












this change, then, may still yield a rank effect. For instance, if there are only two assets, say
assets i and j, then a simultaneous change in their riskiness yields a rank effect as long as
ai  = aj. Thus, even with independent returns, the RAI cannot discriminate between a change
in risk aversion and a simultaneous change in the riskiness of all assets, unless ai = aj ∀(i,j).
Another possibility is to consider independent returns and an idiosyncratic shock, i.e. a
change in the riskiness of only one asset, instead of a simultaneous increase in the riskiness
of all assets. We can show that the rank correlation could be affected in this case as well.
However, if the cross-section of assets is sufﬁciently large (as it should be in the CAPM), it
is reasonable to presume that the change in the rank correlation following the change in the
riskiness of one asset is small. In fact, consider an idiosyncratic shock to a single asset, say
asset i, and suppose that assets i and j are such that λi > λj while Rex
i < Rex
j . If ai > 0,
an increase in σ2
i causes an increase in λi which, therefore, does not change the inequality
λi > λj; in addition, however, it causes an increase in Rex




j , thereby increasing the rank correlation. However, since asset i is
the only asset for which we observe some change (in both its riskiness and return), and given
the independence of the returns on assets, we can expect that, if the cross-section of assets is
large, the change in the rank correlation will be rather small.20
3.3 When is the RAI a good measure of risk aversion?
The previous analysis has focused on the properties of the RAI in the context of the
standard CAPM. This analysis shows that one can prove that the RAI distinguishes between
changes in risk and changes in risk aversion only under very restrictive assumptions.
First, drawing on Misina (2003) we have shown that if asset returns covariate and the
assets in the market portfolio are not equally weighted, the rank correlation between risks and
returns is affected not only by changes in risk aversion but also by changes in the riskiness
of all assets; therefore, the RAI cannot distinguish between a change in risk aversion and a
simultaneous change in the riskiness of all assets. Second, we have shown that, with unequally
weighted assets, the same conclusion applies even if returns are independent. However, with
independent returns and unequally weighted assets, the RAI can distinguish between changes
in risk aversion and idiosyncratic shocks to the riskiness of single assets, provided that the
cross-section of assets is sufﬁciently large.
Thus, proving Propositions 1 and 2 in the context of a CAPM requires either equally
weighted assets, or independent returns, idiosyncratic shocks to the riskiness, and a large
cross-section of assets.
4. An application
Theoretically, the assumptions identiﬁed above under which the RAI can correctly
measure risk aversion are very restrictive. Nonetheless, we should verify empirically to
what extent departures from them bias the measure of risk aversion provided by the RAI.
In principle, this task can be accomplished in two ways. One approach would consist in
estimating, through Montecarlo simulations, the effects of departing from each assumption.
This methodology, however, would be very complicated. In fact, one would need to take
into account not only all the assumptions (e.g. number of assets, joint distribution of their
returns and of the shocks that affect their riskiness, etc.), but also the several ways in which
they may not be satisﬁed. Think, for example, of the hypothesis of independence of asset
returns when there is a large number of different assets. Moreover, this effort may be not
rewarding, since the assumptions that we have identiﬁed (either equally weighted assets, or
independent returns, idiosyncratic shocks to the riskiness and a large cross-section of assets)21
are only sufﬁcient conditions for the RAI to work well. Hence, we cannot exclude that other
sufﬁcient conditions provide the same result.
An alternative method would consist in looking for an indicator that does not suffer from
theoretical shortcomings, and comparing it with the RAI. This method, albeit less precise in
theory, is more relevant for empirical applications. In this section we pursue this strategy and
compare the RAI with a measure of risk aversion derived from the estimation of a CAPM.
To estimate the risk aversion parameter from a standard CAPM we use the classical
methodology introduced by Famaand MacBeth (1973). In linewith the tradition thatestimates
risk aversion on a cross-section of asset returns referred to long time periods (generally from
5 to 10 years), here, for each month t, we run our estimates on a cross-section of monthly
returns referred to the 5 years ending in t.
12 Thus, we obtain a measure of risk aversion that we
can compare with the RAI. Our results will show that, in our sample, the dynamics of these
estimates and that of the RAI are almost equivalent.
4.1 Methodology




i,t = γtλi,t (12)
on a cross-section of assets i, i = 1,...,n, at each time t.
13 The assets included in our analysis
are all the stocks of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx and those of the Standard & Poor’s 500; time
periods are calendar months from January 1973 to November 2005; data is end-of-month; the
sourceisThomson Financial Datastream. To estimateequation (12)we need theexcess returns
Rex
i,t and the covariance of asset i with the market portfolio at time t, λi,t.
Inorder to determine theexcess returnsRex
i,t (which, werecall, areequal toE (Ri,t)−Rf)
we have to ﬁnd the expected returns E (Ri,t). A standard practice followed by the literature
12 For instance, in their classical studies, Black et al. (1972) consider non-overlapping 5-year periods; Fama
and MacBeth (1973) use overlapping periods from 5 to 8 years; Sharpe (1965) uses a single 10-year period.
13 The parameter γt is the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion in the context of the theoretical
model (10); it can be interpreted as an aggregate relative risk aversion of the economy in the context of the more
general model (19) (see AppendixA).22
is to use ex post returns, hereafter denoted, for the sake of simplicity, with Ri,t. By rational
expectations, we can assume that:
Ri,t = E (Ri,t) + εi,t ,
where εi,t is a white noise. Therefore, model (12) becomes:
Ri,t − Rf,t = γtλi,t + εi,t , (13)
where Ri,t − Rf,t = Rex
i,t is the (ex post) excess return, and Rf,t is approximated with the
1-month interest rates for DM-denominated (euro-denominated from January 1999) deposits
when we consider European stocks and dollar-denominated deposits when we consider US
stocks.
14
In order to obtain the regressors λi,t we use the ﬁrst step of the “two-pass” procedure








m,k + ηi,k ,
on a time-series of h periods (i.e. with k that goes from t − h + 1 to t), where αi is an asset-
speciﬁc constant, βi,t is the asset “beta” (namely, it is the covariance between the return on
asset i and the return on market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio),
Rex
m,k is the excess return on the market portfolio, ηi,k is the residual;
15 in our benchmark
regression we set h = 60 months. The outcome of this regression is a point estimate of the
14 To avoid introducing a more cumbersome notation we are using the same symbol Rex
i,t to denote the true
and measured (i.e. ex post) excess returns.
15 We use the stock market indices (Dow Jones Euro Stoxx for the euro area and Standard & Poor’s 500
for the United States) as the market portfolios. Note that our application only includes stock prices. On this
point, the Roll critique (Roll, 1977) pointed out that the validity of the model may depend on the assets included
in the portfolio: the CAPM, in fact, should include all assets, tradable and non-tradable, tangible or intangible,
that add to world wealth. However, Stambaugh (1982) builds a number of market portfolios, which included
also government bonds, corporate bonds, Treasury bills, real estate and consumer durables, and ﬁnds that even
when stocks represent only 10 per cent of the market portfolio, inferences about the model are the same as those
obtained with a stocks-only index.23
parameter ￿ βi,t for each asset i and time t.
16 The product between the variance of Rm in the h
months before period t and ￿ βi,t provides an estimate of λi,t, denoted with ￿ λi,t.
We are now ready to estimate equation (13) on a cross-section of assets using GLS.
Hence, for each time period t we estimate:
R
ex
i,t = kt + γt￿ λi,t + εi,t ,
where γt is our measure of risk aversion, kt is a constant representing the difference between
the true and the measured risk-free rate, and εi,t is the residual.
17 To address the issues of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity, we use the Newey-West estimator with the Bartlett window.
The estimated risk aversion ￿ γt has to be compared with the RAI. The latter is given, for
each time t, by the rank correlation between risks and returns. Following Kumar and Persaud
(2001, 2002), we measure the rank correlation with the Spearman’s coefﬁcient, which we





we write Rt and ￿ λt instead of Ri,t and ￿ λi,t to underscore that the correlation is measured for a
cross-section of returns and risks, for each time t. Consistently with the CAPM estimates, we
consider returns and risks in the 60 months before t.
18
4.2 Results




for the euro area and the United States are illustrated
in Figure 3, together with their conﬁdence intervals.
19 For the euro area, both indicators show
16 The proper speciﬁcation of the CAPM requires that asset weights in the market portfolio do not change
over time. In the stock market index that we have adopted as a proxy for the market portfolio, weights do change.
However, given the large number of assets contained in that index, this is usually considered a good working
approximation (see Ferson et al., 1987, for further discussions of this issue).
17 Recall that according to the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM, kt should be zero. The Black version,
instead, allows for kt  = 0; in this case, kt + Rf,t is the return on the zero-covariance portfolio.
18 Our application departs from the case study of Kumar and Persaud (2002) in three main respects: (i) we
consider monthly stock returns instead of daily exchange-rate returns; (ii) we measure returns and risks over the
sametimeperiod(whiletheyconsidernon-overlappingtimeperiodsandobtainrisksfromtheperiodthatprecedes
the one used to compute returns); (iii) we measure risk with a covariance and not with a variance. Points (ii) and
(iii), in particular, follow directly from the CAPM and the standard ﬁnance literature (see, Cochrane, 2001).
19 Conﬁdence intervals areobtained fromthe GLS estimates fortheCAPMriskaversionand from bootstrap-
ping for the RAI. For the latter indicator, the bootstrapped standard errors are almost identical to the asymptotic
standard errors of the linear correlation coefﬁcient (1/
√
n −3, where n is the sample size).24
a steady decrease from 1982 to 1997, an increase until 2000, corresponding to the peak in
world stock markets, and a renewed decline from then until the end of 2005; the average of the
CAPM risk aversion coefﬁcient is equal to 2.1. For the United States, results are somewhat
different: the two indicators steadily increase from 1984 to 1997 and decrease thereafter,
reaching negative values; the CAPM risk aversion coefﬁcient has an average of 4.5.
The results on the average level of the CAPM risk aversions in the euro area and in the
United States are in line with those of the literature (see the classic Friend and Blume, 1975,
or, for a survey, Cochrane, 2001, Chapter 21 and the references therein). Instead, the values
taken by the RAI, which is a correlation coefﬁcient, are different, and are always included in
the interval [−1,1]. Recall from Section 2, however, that the RAI can only detect changes in
risk aversion. Therefore, its level is not very informative. On the other hand, its dynamics
are mostly relevant and, as Figure 3 shows, this turns out to be very similar to that of the
CAPM-based indicator.
These results prove quite robust to several changes in the estimation strategy. For both
stock indices, the behavior of risk aversion estimated with the two indicators has remained
essentially the same after any change performed in our sensitivity analysis. First, we have
focused on the assets included in the regressions. In fact, plugging directly an estimate of
λi,t into equation (13) causes an errors-in-variable problem, which is usually addressed by
gathering stocks into portfolios in order to increase the precision of the betas (Campbell et
al., 1997, Chapter 5). Hence, along the lines of Fama and French (1992) we have considered:
(i) 20 value-weighted portfolios obtained by ranking the stocks by size; and (ii) 25 portfolios
obtained by ranking stock returns in 5 percentiles by size and 5 by book-to-market-value and
considering their intersection.
Second, as an alternative method of addressing the problems of heteroskedasticity and
correlation of theresiduals, wehaveincluded in the regressiontwo other explanatory variables;
namely, the logarithm of market capitalization (Schwert, 1983) and the “systematic” skewness
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976).
20
20 The “systematic” skewness is introduced in order to account for the possible effect of higher order mo-
ments of theutilityfunction of the representative investor. FollowingKraus and Litzenberger(1976), we compute
it as: E[(Ri − E(Ri))(Rm −E(Rm))2]/E[(Rm −E(Rm))3].25
Third, we have also experimented with different indices representing the market
portfolio, such as indicators with equally-weighted stocks and indices with a subset of value-
weighted stocks. Similarly, we have performed regressions using as assets only the stocks that
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Figure 3: CAPM risk aversion and Risk Appetite Index
(the thin lines show the 95% conﬁdence intervals)
Fourth, we experimented different sizes of the moving window in the time-series
regressions, using h = 36, 24 and 12 months. This set of robustness tests is the only one that
has produced signiﬁcant differences with respect to the benchmark regression. Speciﬁcally,26
by shrinking the size of the moving window we have obtained, not surprisingly, more volatile
dynamics of the risk aversion.
Overall, the most striking and robust result is the strong correlation between the RAI and
the CAPM-based measure of risk aversion. The correlation between the two indicators over
the entire sample period is 0.88 for the euro area, and 0.75 for the United States. In addition,
both correlations are very large in any sub-period of our sample and have remained strong in
all our robustness checks; as a matter of fact, seldom have we obtained a correlation smaller
than 0.7. Thus, despite the theoretical differences discussed in Section 4, the RAI and the
CAPM-based measure of risk aversion provide essentially the same results. We devote the
next section to the explanation of this puzzle.
4.3 Explaining the similarities




we need to focus
on the statistical properties of both indicators.
First, recall that Spearman’s rank correlation ρs is a robust statistic for the linear
correlation ρ (see Huber, 1981, Chapter 8, and Stuart and Ord, 1991, Chapter 26). Thus,









21 Hence, our problem becomes that










that we can rewrite as:




  ct , (14)
21 For both samples, the correlation between ρ and ρs is about 0.97 in our benchmark, and remains very high
in all the robustness tests performed.27
where ρ(Rt,￿ λt) denotes the linear correlation between Rt and ￿ λt for the cross-section of assets






















which is the result we were looking for. The required condition is largely met in our two







To sum up,although thetheoreticalanalysisperformed inSections3 and4 suggestedthat
one needs very restrictive assumptions to prove that the RAI is an indicator of risk aversion,
the evidence illustrated in Figure 3 shows that the RAI could be a proxy of a standard CAPM-




and ￿ γt stems from two
main elements: (i) the rank correlation is approximately equal to the linear correlation; (ii)
provided that a certain variance is sufﬁciently low, the dynamics of the regression coefﬁcient
in the equation that explains returns with risks are approximately equal to those of the linear
correlation between returns and risks.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical and an empirical analysis of the Risk Appetite Index
of Kumar and Persaud (2001, 2002). The theoretical analysis shows that, in general, the
RAI cannot correctly identify risk aversion in a standard CAPM. In fact, if the assets in the
market portfolio are not equally weighted, the RAI requires very restrictive assumptions, such
as independent asset returns, idiosyncratic shocks to riskiness and a sufﬁciently large cross-
section of assets.
Although these assumptions are theoretically restrictive, it is necessary to evaluate
empirically the extent to which they tend to bias the RAI. A simple way to accomplish this
task is to compare the RAI with a measure of risk aversion derived from the estimation of a
CAPM. Hence, we consider as a case study the stocks of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx and those28
of the Standard & Poor’s 500 from January 1973 to November 2005. This comparison shows
that the behavior of these two indicators is surprisingly similar.
By focusing on the statistical properties of the RAI, we prove that, under a certain
condition, this indicator may provide a good approximation of the risk aversion parameter
of a CAPM. This condition requires the ratio between the variance of the return on assets and
the variance of their riskiness to be approximately constant.
Thus, despite the sharp theoretical differences, the RAI shares strong empirical
similarities with the CAPM indicator. It is worth noticing, however, that the use of the RAI
does not yield any real beneﬁt while, at the same time, it entails several shortcomings. First,
with respect to a CAPM indicator, it is not computationally easier to calculate. Second, it is
not derived from the estimation of an equation and, hence, it is not possible to evaluate the
goodness of ﬁt or assess the reliability of the underlying model. On the other hand, from the
analysis performed in Section 4 it follows that phases of sharp increase in the ratio between
the cross-sectional variance of the returns on assets and the cross-sectional variance of their
riskiness would distort the RAI. Therefore, one should always be careful and preliminarily
check whether the variance ratio is sufﬁciently low over the entire sample period. Another
drawback is given by the fact that the RAI can only detect changes in risk aversion, while
other available measures provide an assessment of its very level, a more comprehensive piece
of information.Appendix: Heterogenous agents with risk averse preferences
Section 4 was based on the restrictive assumptions that agents are identical and that their
preferences are given by CARA utility functions. Following Huang and Litzenberger (1988),
here we discuss a more general setting where agents are heterogeneous in both preferences
and wealth. In this more general model our conclusions on the RAI will remain essentially
unchanged once we focus on an appropriately speciﬁed global risk aversion parameter. This
is because this setting leads to a version of the CAPM that has the same functional form as
equation (10).
We assume that preferences are represented by increasing and concave utility functions.
With respect to the previous section, we will maintain the assumption that asset returns are
multivariate normally distributed. In addition, we will redeﬁne the problem in terms of shares
of wealth rather that in value terms. Namely, denote by ai,h the amount of wealth invested in




The total wealth of the N investors in the economy is Wm =
￿N
h=1 Wh. In equilibrium,
the total wealth Wm is equal to the total value of the assets. We denote with wi,m the portfolio







Using the budget constraint (6), we can rewrite the consumption Ch = af,hRf +
￿n



















The maximization problem of this investor, whose preferences are represented by the











wi,hWh (Ri − Rf)
￿￿￿
. (16)
Let us assume that a solution to (16) exists. Since uh is concave, the ﬁrst order










wi,hWh (Ri − Rf)
￿
  (Ri − Rf)
￿
= 0 ∀i = 1,...,n, (17)
where the coefﬁcients wi,h are the optimal shares of wealth invested in asset i by individual h.
The optimal consumption of this investor then is:
Ch = WhRf +
n ￿
i=1
wi,hWh (Ri − Rf) .











































which we can substitute back into the previous expression and, recalling that E (Ri − Rf) =
Rex



































































Note that theﬁrst term in brackets on theright-hand side is theharmonic meanof theinvestors’




















































which represent a sort of aggregate relative risk aversion of the economy, we get:
R
ex
i = Γ   Cov(Ri,Rm) , (19)
which has exactly the same functional form as (10).
Equation (10) shows that our conclusions on the risk appetite index do not depend on the
speciﬁchypothesismadefor theinvestors’preferences: aslong asassetreturnsaremultivariate
normally distributed (a hypothesis that cannot be rejected for monthly and quarterly data) they
hold for any non-satiated and risk averse preferences.References
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